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Abstract. Although important, the spatial dimension is often neglected in studies of market power and competition in 
agricultural markets. This paper investigates spatial competition for raw milk between dairies under the presence of 
marketing cooperatives. Since observed in reality, our model is based on uniform delivered pricing and overlapping 
market  areas.  We  compare  spatial  cooperative  price  matching  with  non-cooperative  Hotelling-Smithies  conduct. 
Utilizing a vector error correction model we show that the observed low price transmission in Germany is in line with 
cooperative behaviour. This seems rational since it increases processors profits. The abolition of the quota system 
may increase price transmission. 
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1.  Introduction 
Two major characteristics of agricultural production are a strong dependency on land and a low product 
value per unit of weight and/or volume. This is particularly true for milk where scattered production of 
raw milk at the farm level and centralized processing in dairies is linked by costly shipping. Hence, 
incorporating a spatial dimension is important in the analysis of such agricultural markets. This is even 
more true given an increasing concentration within the processing sector. For example, the number of 
milk processing facilities decreased by approximately 21% in Germany between 1997 and 2006, whereas 
the processed quantity remained at a constant level (ZMP, 2008). As a consequence, the average distance 
between production and processing of milk has increased. High shipping cost and the unequal distribution 
of suppliers and demanders have crucial implications - most important that processors are able to exert 
spatial market power.
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Although there is an extensive literature on spatial m onopoly (e.g. Beckmann, 1976; Phlips, 1983; 
Greenhut et al., 1987) and spatial competition between suppliers (e.g. Capozza and Van Order, 1978; 
Gronberg and Meyer, 1981), there are few studies analyzing spatial market power within an input market 
framework. Notable exceptions are Löfgren (1985, 1986) and Zhang and Sexton (2001). Löfgren (1985) 
empirically analyzes the price list of the Swedish pulpwood market with respect to spatial price theory 
while Löfgren (1986) investigates different pricing policies of a spatial monopsonist. Zhang and Sexton 
(2001) examine a firm’s decision with respect to the pricing policy in a duopsony market. 
One important pricing strategy often applied in agricultural markets in general and for milk in particular 
is a uniform delivered (ud) price. Under ud pricing (udp) producers receive the same price from the 
processor independent of their relative location to the processing facility. Whereas prices are seemingly 
independent from the distance, differences in transportation costs imply net prices to be a function of 
distance. Since local prices do not reflect transportation costs, udp is a price discriminating strategy and  
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an indicator of local market power (Phlips, 1983). Moreover, udp can facilitate overlapping market areas 
among competing firms, something that we frequently observe in reality for milk, but also for other 
agricultural products like tomatoes (Durham et al., 1996). Taking this into account Alvarez et al. (2000) 
in their seminal work in the European Review of Agricultural Economics develop a spatial duopsony 
model of milk processors using udp. Their study is the first attempt to explicitly consider spatial aspects 
of market power in overlapping markets with udp. A key result of their study is that firms may set prices 
above the monopsony level to minimize direct competition among them. Hence, firms act cooperatively 
or collusively. However, their result is based on the conjecture of price-matching (PM) behaviour, i.e. 
each processor assumes that its rivals will match any proposed price change. 
The aim of this paper is threefold: First, we will present a model which includes also the alternative non-
cooperative Hotelling-Smithies (HS) conjecture, i.e. that a firm expects no change of the competitor’s 
price in response to a variation of its own price. Second, we account for additional features important in 
the raw milk market as the presence of marketing cooperatives and the European quota system. In regard 
to the latter, instead of a linear or inelastic supply function as usual in spatial competition models, we 
introduce a more flexible function to capture both, supply under a quota and without a quota system. 
Third, based on our theoretical findings we empirically test whether milk processors in Germany follow a 
cooperative  (PM)  or  non-cooperative  (HS)  pricing  strategy.  In  particular,  utilizing  time  series 
econometrics we test whether the observed price transmission is consistent with PM or HS conjectures.  
The rest of the study is organized as follows. The next section represents our theoretical model and 
derives comparative statics for PM and HS competition. Section 3 represents a vector error correction 
model to test empirically whether price transmission in the German raw milk market is consistent with 
PM or HS conjectures. Section 4 describes utilized data and Section 5 represents empirical results. We 
draw conclusions in Section 6.  
2.  Theoretical Model 
2.1.  General Model 
To highlight the alternative assumptions of firms’ spatial competitive behaviour, we follow Capozza and 
Van Order (1978) and Gronberg and Meyer (1981) by using a conjectural variation term . In the case of 
two firms (A and B) and an ud price u,  = ∂uB/∂uA, i.e. the response in price firm A expects from firm B 
given an own-price variation. In line with Gronberg and Meyer (1981) one can distinguish 3 different 
conjectures in spatial udp models:
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1.  Hotelling-Smithies (HS): The firm expects no change of the competitor’s price in response 
to a variation of its own price (HS = 0).
 If so, the firm can increase its market radius R and 
∂R/∂u > 0. 
2.  Lösch (L): The firm expects the competitor will exactly match any price variation (L = 1) 
and suppliers choose to trade with the closest firm. The market radius is fixed (∂R/∂u = 0). 
3.  Price-matching  (PM):  The  modified  Lösch-assumption  for  ud  pricing  (L = 1),  where 
suppliers choose the firm randomly. Markets overlap and the radii depend on the price 
(∂R/∂u < 0).  
L-competition does not allow for overlapping market areas. Because the price has to be the same at each 
point in the market, firms either have to commit to fixed and exclusive market regions or suppliers always 
have to deliver to the closest processor. Since this is hardly observed in reality, we do not pursue this 
conjecture here. The PM-conjecture is based on the same competitive conduct, but as introduced by 
Gronberg and Meyer (1981) allows for overlapping market areas.
3 Exclusive market areas are usually also 
derived in a HS competition framework (Schuler and Hobbs, 1982; Zhang and Sexton, 2001). Moreover, 
according to Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) or Beckmann (1973) a price equilibrium in pure strategies does 
not exist under HS competition. However, we will below show that both findings are not necessarily true 
if marketing cooperatives exist. 
Our spatial economic model is based on common assumptions (see e.g. Capozza and Van Order, 1979;  
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Löfgren, 1986; Zhang and Sexton, 2001): a single homogeneous input is produced in a line market by 
equally  distributed  suppliers.  With  no  loss  of  generality  the  supplier  density  is  set  equal  to  one.  As 
illustrated in Figure 1 two processors A and B are located at the end points of the line (Kats and Thisse, 
1989; Zhang and Sexton, 2001). The distance between the processing firms (and at the same time the 
market size) is d = 1. The distance from processor A and B to a farmer is measured with r and 1 - r, 
respectively.  The  transport  rate  t,  which  represents  the  cost  of  transporting  one  unit  per  distance,  is 
constant and identical at any point r in the market. The price received by a supplier (at its location r) is 
the uniform delivered price u. We assume a supply function of the form q(r) = w(u) = xu
y with q is the 
quantity produced,  x is a constant and  y the elasticity of supply. For simplicity and  with no loss of 
generality we can set x = 1 and y ≥ 0. Hence, our input supply function is more flexible than in most 
previous studies and can gasp a quota system (y = 0 or close to 0), but also situations with higher price 
elasticity (y > 0). Beside the raw milk price u, other processing costs c are assumed to be constant. Hence, 
the net product price p is p = P – c, with P being the price received by the processor for the finished 
product.
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Let’s now first assume that processor A has a monopsonistic position. The “local” profit of A at any point 
r is: 
  ) ( ) ( ) ( r q tr u p r       (1) 
Under udp, local prices as well as the local supply are equal at any point in the market. However, since 
transport costs increase with distance local profits decrease. The monopsonist’s profit is given by: 
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Maximizing equation (2) with respect to R and u yields first order conditions 
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According to equation (4), firms do not serve a location r where local profits are negative, i.e. at distances 
where input price u plus the transport costs tr exceed net revenues p. This is a common assumption in udp 
models where the market radius R* is defined by zero profits at this location (Schuler and Hobbs, 1982; 
Alvarez et al. 2000; Zhang and Sexton, 2001). However, due to exogenous restrictions or competition, the 
firm may not be able to choose the optimal market radius. In this context, a particular characteristic of the 
(German) raw milk market is important: farmers may cooperate to concentrate raw milk supply. Such 
marketing  cooperatives  are  a  form  of  horizontal  integration  and  are  common  for  certain  agricultural 
goods (e.g. cereals or milk) or production techniques (e.g. organic farming). In 2007, 139 marketing 
cooperatives are registered in the German milk sector (BMELV, 2008). The share of processed milk 
delivered by marketing cooperatives was for example 34 % in Saxony for the year 2005 and 20 % in 
Bavaria in 2008.
5 Formation of such cooperatives is supported by law (Marktstrukturgesetz). For instance, 
subsidies to support foundation can be received in the first 5 years after approval. Additionally, marketing 
cooperatives are eligible to apply for investment grants. 
The introduction of marketing cooperatives has important consequences for the spatial competition model.  
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Members of marketing cooperatives may be (arbitrarily) distributed over the market region. Processors 
competing for marketing cooperatives’ supply have to accept to collect milk from some locations where it 
is not profitable. If a processor is not able to reject single members of a cooperative, the market radius R 
of a firm is fixed to the interfirm distance d, i.e. replacing R in equation 6 with d. In this case, our spatial 
model is comparable to a framework studied by Kats and Thisse (1989) or Iozzi (2004). Both investigate 
a spatial udp duopoly where the firms do not ration supply.
6 Consequently, the processor buys from all 
points inside the interfirm distance  d. An exogenous market radius is a common condition in spatial 
economics,  e.g.  to  compare  the  properties  of  spatial  price  strategies  in  a  monopolistic  framework 
(Beckmann,  1976).  Nevertheless,  under  competition  this  assumption  is  critical  if  transport  costs  (or 
distances among neighbouring processors) are so high that locally separated monopolies (monopsonies) 
could exist. However, this is unlikely for the (German) raw milk market with still a sufficiently large 
number of processors in business.  
Based on this framework, we can now compare the PM with the HS conjecture. Both represent extremes 
settings of spatial competition. While the firm under PM internalizes the decision of the competitor to 
maximize  overall  profit,  the  HS  firm  aims  to  benefit  from  outbidding  the  competitor.  Hence,  PM 
represents cooperative and HS non-cooperative competitive behaviour. 
2.2.  Price-matching (PM) conjecture  
Since firms assume that every price change will be answered by an equal adjustment of the competitor’s 
price, the rational choice is to maximize the cumulative profit over the whole market. Consequently, both 
firms set the same ud price. Assuming that input suppliers have no preference for distance, we can assume 
that they choose a processor with equal probability. This is called the random tie breaking rule (RTBR) 
(Iozzi, 2004). Accordingly, the market profit with PM processors is: 
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At all locations A and B share supply equally. Therefore, ΠA = ΠB = ½ ΠPM . Because of the existence of 
marketing cooperatives, processors have to serve the whole market area (R = d). Processors’ optimal 
price 
opt
PM u  is derived by the differentiation of equation 7 with respect to u: 
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Not surprisingly, the result for the cooperative PM conjecture is the price of a monopsony with exogenous 
market radius (compare with equation 3 in the case of R = d). 
2.3.  Hotelling-Smithies (HS) conjecture 
Iozzi (2004) shows, that under the RTBR a price equilibrium in pure strategies exists. Basically, the firm 
may capture a location with the highest price or share the location if the prices are equal. The processor 
operating under this framework faces three options: setting a higher (+), a lower () or the same price (=) 
as the rival. If the competitor’s price is u’, the processor’s profit is given by  
dr tr u p u u u
d
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Given the presence of marketing cooperatives and R = d, the processor with a lower price will not be able 
to capture any location. This is in contrast to standard udp competition models (Beckmann, 1973; Schuler  
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and Hobbs, 1982; Zhang and Sexton, 2001). Since these models assume exclusively positive local profits 
inside a firm’s market radius, a residual market may exist. For example, if B’s price is sufficiently high 
and  B  is  free  to  choose  R  (see  equation  4),  all  locations  r  in  [0, 1 - RB]  will  not  be  served  by  B. 
Consequently, it can be profitable for firm A to use a low (monopsonistic) ud price in this (proximate) 
region and Π
(-)
A > 0 if u < u’. However, in our model including marketing cooperatives we may observe 
negative local profits if u is sufficient high (see Figure 1).
7 Therefore, distant locations can lower the 
overall profit of the processor. Given this, profits under u > u’ (equation 9a) are always higher than under 
u = u’ (equation 9a) and u < u’ (equation 9a), unless all alternatives yield zero profits. Hence, a price 
equilibrium exists. Solving the zero profit condition 
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According  to  equation  (10)  at  opt
HS u  both  firms  earn  zero  profits.  Particularly, A  (B)  yields  positive 
(negative) profits at all locations r in [0, d/2] and negative (positive) profits for r=[d/2, d]. 
Comparing these results with the case of PM conjecture, we notice that the ud-price is higher and profits 
are lower under HS.
8 Optimal prices, profits and comparative statics are compared in Table 1. Regarding 
the spatially related variables  t and d we follow Alvarez et al. (2000) by defining td = s to measure the 
absolute importance of space. As shown in Table 1 the effect of s on the ud-price is negative for HS and 
PM-conduct. However, if space becomes more important the optimal price will decrease less under HS 
than under PM. 
Additionally,  the  optimal  ud  price  under  HS-competition  (equation  11)  is  independent  of  the  price 
elasticity of supply and the price transmission is always (∂u/∂p = 1.0). Perfect price transmission is an 
indicator that HS competition corresponds to non-cooperative behaviour.
9 Under PM conduct the price 
and price transmission depend on y. Since s ≤ 2 under spatial competition, both relations are positive. The 
dependency between price transmission and y is illustrated in Figure 2. Given a quota system, the supply 
elasticity for raw milk can be assumed to be inelastic. In this case, the price transmission under PM 
conjecture is less than 0.5. Both firms set prices believing that the competitor will set the same ud price. 
The  competitive  conduct  is  cooperative.  In  this  way,  firms  can  (more  efficiently)  exploit  their  local 
market power by means of both lower prices and lower price transmission.  
3.  Empirical model 
To test empirically whether price transmission in the German raw milk market is consistent with PM 
(∂u/∂p ≤ 1.0)  or  HS  (∂u/∂p = 1.0)  conjecture  we  utilize  a  vector  error  correction  model  (VECM) 











  (12) 
where ∆Pt is a (2×1) vector of the first differences of the producer price (price of raw milk; ut) and the 
wholesale price (price of processed milk; pt); Γ is a (2×2) matrix of coefficients representing short-run 
relationships between variables; Π is a (2×2) matrix of long-run and speed of adjustment coefficients; Pt-1  
is a (r×1) vector of the cointegrating relation, with r being the number of cointegrating relations; and εt is 
a white noise process. Matrix Π can be decomposed into two matrices α and β, where Π = αβ’. Matrix α 
characterizes the speed of adjustment, i.e. the coefficient shows how fast the variables move back to the 
long-run relationship after a shock or a change of the equilibrium. Matrix  β is labelled cointegrating 
coefficient and represents the long-run relationship (Lütkepohl, 2005; Hamilton, 1994). Hence, a VECM 
is a first-differenced vector autoregressive (VAR) model incorporating cointegration. As such, it accounts 
for interdependences between producer and wholesale prices upstream and downstream. In addition, the 
model analyses the long-run relationship as well as the short-term dynamics between both prices.   
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Prior to estimating the VECM some tests have to be carried out. First, all prices are tested for stationarity 
and their integration order using an augmented Dickey-Fuller (1979) test: 
t l t s t t t t t y ... y y y y                      2 2 1 1 1   with     1 ,  (13) 
Where yt is a price series and , , 1, … t-s, are coefficients to be estimated. The null hypothesis is 
nonstationarity (H0: ρ = 0). The alternative hypothesis H1 is ρ < 0. The number of lagged differences s is 
derived based on the Akaike information criterion.  
Second, Johansen’s (1988, 1991; Johansen and Juselius, 1990) test on cointegration is carried out to test 
whether there exists a long-run relationship and to derive the number of cointegrating relations (Granger, 
1981; Engle and Granger, 1987). We carry out two likelihood ratio (LR) tests: the trace statistic and the 
maximum-eigenvalue statistic. The trace statistic is defined as: 
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Where  ro  is  the  assumed  number  of  cointegrating  relations  (r  =  0,  1,  …,  k-1),  k  is  the  number  of 
endogenous variables, λ is the i-th largest eigenvalue of the Π matrix and T is the number of time periods. 
At  the  most  there  are  k-1  cointegrating  vectors.  The  null  hypothesis  is  H0:  rk(Π)  =  r0,  i.e.  the 
cointegrating rank rk is r0 (H1: r0 < rk(Π) ≤ k). The maximum-eigenvalue statistic is: 
  ) ln( T ) r , r ( LR r 1 0 0 0 1 1         (15) 
The  null  hypothesis  is H0: rk(Π) = r0 versus H1: rk(Π) = r0 + 1. For both statistics we test the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration (H0: rk(Π) = 0) as well as the null hypothesis of one cointegrating relation 
(H0: rk(Π) = 1). Cointegration between two variables can only exist if the variables have the same order 
of integration.  
Third, causality between variables is determined using a Granger (1969, 1988) causality test. We test for 
both, if p Granger causes u and vice versa. To test whether p causes u we estimate a regression with u as 
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The null hypothesis is given by γ1 = γ2 = ... = γm = 0 (H1: γj ≠ 0 for at least one j ≤ m). If the null hypothesis 
is rejected, i.e. p gives additional explanatory power for u, p Granger causes u. The same but reversed 
regression is utilized to test whether u causes  p.  
4.  Data 
To estimate the VECM monthly price data for raw milk at the producer level and for dairy products at 
wholesale level are utilized. The data are collected for Germany from January 1997 to December 2006. 
The  producer  price  for  raw  milk  is  in  Cent  per  kilogram  and  compiled  by  ZMP  (1998-2007).  The 
wholesale price is the weighted average wholesale price of fresh milk, cheese, butter and milk powder in 
Cent per kilogram (based on data from ZMP, 1998-2007) taking into account the quantity of raw milk 
contained in each kilogram of the product. 
Descriptive statistics for both prices are provided in Table 2. The mean producer price is 28.77 Cent per 
kilogram and fluctuates between 26.23 and 34.79 Cent per kilogram. The mean wholesale price is 41.26 
Cent per kilogram and ranges from 37.54 to 46.84 Cent per kilogram. Standard deviations between prices 
are not significantly different.   
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5.  Empirical results 
Based on visual inspection and analysis of the data (Hamilton, 1994, p. 501 et seq.) we carry out an ADF 
test including a constant and no time trend. The Akaike information criterion (AIC) is used to determine 
the appropriate lag-length. For both price series at the level the null hypothesis of a unit root is not 
rejected at the 10% significance level, but rejected at the 1% significance level for the first difference 
(Table 3). Therefore, all producer and wholesale prices are integrated of order one.
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To determine the number of lags in the VECM we use two lag length criteria, Akaike   information 
criterion (AIC) and the final prediction error (FPE). Several VAR models with different lag lengths  – 
from zero to twelve lags – are estimated and analyzed regarding their AIC and FPE values. The model 
with  the  lowest  AIC  respectively  FPE  has  the  optimal  lag  length  for  a  VAR  (Yang  et  al.,  2006; 
Holtemöller, 2004; Brüggemann, 2006). For a VECM, the optimal lag length is the chosen lag length of a 
VAR model minus one lag (Lütkepohl, 2007). The AIC and FPE results report four lags for Germany as 
optimal choice for a VAR model. Therefore, we use three lags for the VECM.  
Table 4 shows the results of the Johansen’s cointegration test. The precondition for cointegration that 
both variables have the same order of integration is fulfilled. Each cointegration equation includes an 
intercept and the price variables. The null hypothesis of no cointegrating equation is rejected at the 5% 
significance level based on both, the trace and the maximum-eigenvalue statistics. In both cases, we failed 
to reject the null hypothesis of one cointegrating equation. Therefore, the results indicate that there is one 
cointegrating relation, i.e. a long-run relationship between the producer price and the wholesale price 
exists. 
Results of the Granger causality test are described in Table 5. They confirm a bidirectional relationship 
between producer and wholesale price, i.e. the causality relationship goes downstream and upstream.  









  (17) 
Estimated coefficients of the cointegrating equation and their t-statistics are represented in Table 6. The 
alpha coefficient is significant at the 1% level for the producer price. The speed of adjustment coefficient 
for the wholesale price is not statistically significant. The beta coefficients are significant at the 1% level. 
Hence, there is a long-run relationship between the producer and wholesale price.  
Table 7 presents the estimates of the VECM. The results show the long-run relationship and the short-run 
dynamics.  As  the  long-run  relationship  is  already  explained   above  we  analyze  now  the  short -run 
dynamics. 
As we can see the VECM clearly shows the upstream and downstream relationship. The second column 
Δut  represents  the  transmission  from  downstream  prices  (=  wholesale  price)  to  upstream  prices  (= 
producer  price).  The  third  column  Δpt  demonstrate  the  converse  relationship,  i.e.  the  influence  of 
upstream prices on downstream prices. The short-run dynamics for each dependent variable Δut and Δpt 
include three periods. Therefore three lagged variables of the producer price as well as the wholesale 
price are used as independent variables. 
To analyze empirically if price transmission is in line with PM or HS competition we investigate the 
impact of the lagged wholesale price on the current producer price. All three lagged wholesale prices are 
positive and statistically significant at least at the 5% level. Adding up price transmission over all three 
periods we  get a quite low value of 0.312. Hence, a change of the wholesale price  of one Cent per 
kilogram will result in a change of the producer price of 0.312 Cents per kilogram. This value is within 
the interval of 0.0 and 0.5 as predicted by the PM model. Additionally, we carry out a Wald test with the 
null hypothesis that the added lagged wholesale prices are equal to one (H0: Δpt-1 + Δpt-2 + Δpt-3 = 1 and 
H1: Δpt-1 + Δpt-2 + Δpt-3 ≠ 1; H0 implies Hotelling-Smithies competition). The null hypothesis is rejected 
at the 1% significance level. Hence, upstream price transmission in the German milk market is far away 
from being perfect and supports the existence of PM competition and collusion. 
Downstream price transmission from the producer price to the wholesale price is only significant for the 
second lagged producer price. Added up price transmission over all three periods is 0.545.  
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6.  Conclusion 
While agricultural production is highly scattered, food processing becomes more and more concentrated. 
Moreover, agricultural products suffer from high transportation costs compared to their product value. 
Therefore, farmers easily face market power from input buyers. As a counter strategy, farmers often 
horizontally  cooperate  via  marketing  cooperatives.  In  Germany,  such  cooperatives  are  frequently 
established by milk producers and they hold a significant share of overall raw milk production. Another 
characteristic of agricultural markets in general, and for the raw milk market in particular, is uniform 
delivered pricing (udp), i.e. input buyers absorbing transportation cost. Alvarez et al. (2000) developed a 
spatial duopsony model with ud pricing and showed that price-matching (PM) behaviour of processors 
matches  up  with  the  real  world  observation  of  overlapping,  and  hence  inefficient,  markets  in  milk 
procurement. In this paper we demonstrate that given the existence of marketing cooperatives, one may 
also  observe  overlapping  market  areas  under  the  contrary  Hotelling-Smithies  (HS)  assumption. 
Technically, this means that price equilibrium in pure strategies exists. However, while PM is in line with 
cooperative behaviour among food processing firms, HS competition represents non-cooperation, i.e., 
under  HS  there  is  fierce  price  competition.  This  is  supported  by  our  theoretical  finding  that  price 
transmission is perfect under HS, but imperfect under PM.  
In addition, our spatial competition model incorporates a more flexible input supply function than usually 
utilized in spatial models. An interesting result derived from this feature is that price transmission under 
PM competition rises with increasing supply elasticity. This finding is of particular interest in regard to 
the process of abolishing the quota system in the EU. Since we can expect that the abolition will increase 
supply elasticity at the farm level, this may increase price transmission and may have a positive impact on 
producer prices. 
Empirically, we test whether price transmission between milk processors and producers in Germany is in 
line with PM or HS competition. Based on a vector error correction model we find a price transmission of 
0.31. This strongly points to PM conduct and cooperative behaviour between processors. Hence,  our 
results  support  the  PM  assumption  in  Alvarez  et  al.  (2000).  However,  additionally  we  provide  an 
explanation  why  firms  may  compete  according  to  this  conjecture.  In  the  presence  of  marketing 
cooperatives, HS implies lower profits than PM competition. If both firms behave according to PM, this 
results in a Pareto optimal outcome. Nevertheless, HS is a dominant strategy in the static game. Hence, a 
static Nash equilibrium exists where both firms assume HS. However, our empirical results suggest that 
milk processors are able to overcome this prisoner’s dilemma. One intuitive explanation could be that 
price interactions among dairies can be interpreted as supergames. According to Friedmann (1971), the 
equilibrium of such a game is non-cooperative and Pareto optimal.  
Our empirical result is also in line with a low, but not zero, individual milk supply elasticity as expected 
under the presence of a quota system. In fact, under a quota system milk supply is not fixed at the 
individual farm level, but the costs of expansion at the individual level increase by the need to acquire 
extra quota. For our theoretical duopsony model, a price transmission of 0.31 corresponds to a milk 
supply  elasticity  of  0.45  (with  ∂u/∂p   =  y/(y + 1).  This  seems  to  be  in  line  with  further  studies:  for 
example, Colman et al. (2005) apply different regression techniques to data of specialized milk producing 
farms in two regions of the U.K. between 1991 and 1995, a time during which the milk marketing quota 
of the U.K. was almost constant. With one exception all their estimates are in a range from 0.27 to 0.63 
depending on the estimation technique. Bouamra-Mechemache  et al. (2008) utilize Theil–Goldberger 
mixed  estimation  method  and  time  series  data  for  EU  member  states.  They  derive  medium  supply 
elasticities  for  the  EU-15  countries  between  0.3  and  0.5.  Komaki  and  Penzer  (2005)  estimate  price 
elasticities under a quota system for two different regions in Japan of 0.12 and 0.24.  
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Endnotes: 
                                                            
1   A comprehensive discussion regarding the introduction of space in neoclassical theory is e.g. Eaton 
and Lipsey (1977). 
2   Prior to Gronberg and Meyer (1981), Capozza and Van Order (1978) identified three different 
conjectures  under the fob (free on board) regime: HS, L and Greenhut -Ohta (GH). Under GH 
competition,  each firm assumes that the price at the market border is fixed. This leads to an 
increasing (decreasing) own price if the rival decreases (increases) its price. (GO = -1). However, this 
is not applicable under udp since prices have to be equal at each point of the market to be equal at the 
market border. Thus, it is not feasible to keep the price at the market border constant if one firm 
increases and the other firm decreases its ud price. 
3   In fact, Avarez et al. (2000) name their assumed conjecture Löschian competition, but their model 
makes clear that it is the same as PM in our terminology which follows Gronberg and Meyer (1981). 
4   With P being constant, we implicitly assume perfect competition in the final good market, which is 
the common assumption for a spatial oligopsony (Löfgren, 1986; Alvarez et al., 2000; Zhang and 
Sexton, 2001). 
5   Data are published online at http://www.statistik.sachsen.de, www.lfl.bayern.de, http://www.bayern-
meg.de, and http://www.interessengemeinschaft-ige-sachsen.de/.  
6   To justify the no rationing assumption Dixon (1990) introduced costs of turning down customers in 
terms of loss of goodwill, reputation or offence caused. The autho r’s conclusion is that firms are 
willing to meet demand in excess of their profit-maximizing supply to avoid these costs. Baye and 
Morgan (2002) argue that many price setting oligopoly environments have the feature to award the 
whole production on a winner-take-all basis. In this case again firms need to deviate from the profit-
maximizing  supply  since  rationing  is  not  feasible.  Iozzi  (2004)  states  that  firms  may  be  also 
prevented  from  rationing  by  regulatory  requirements  to  satisfy  all  the  demand  (e.g.  electricity 
markets in the UK or car insurance in Germany). The existence of  marketing cooperatives  with 
members distributed across land is a further argument in favor of the no rationing assumption. 
7   A major characteristic of udp is cross-subsidization of distant suppliers by customers which are close 
to the processor. The possibility of negative local profits is just an extension of this feature. 
8   This is true over the economic reasonable range of 0   td/p  2 where spatial competition occurs. If 
td/p ≥ 2, we have to consider spatial monopsonies instead of competition because 2R  d (with R 
defined by equation 4). Moreover, the assumption of R = d would yield neither positive profits nor 
positive prices if td/p ≥ 2. 
9   If markets are perfectly competitive or in the case of fierce price competition (e.g. under the classical 
Bertrand competition) we find the same result regarding price transmission as under the described HS 
scenario. 
10   For comparison and completeness we also carried out an ADF test for all other options (no constant 
and  no  time  trend;  constant  and  time  trend)  The  results  are  equal  to  the  case  presented  here  (a 
constant only) except for the case of no constant and no time trend where the null hypothesis of a unit 
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Table 1:  Summary of the theoretical findings regarding Hotelling-Smithies (HS) and Price-
Matching (PM) behavior 
  HS  PM 
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Table 2:  Descriptive Statistics of Producer and Wholesale Prices  
  Producer Price  Wholesale price 
Mean  28.77  41.26 
Median  28.44  40.87 
Maximum  34.79  46.84 
Minimum  26.23  37.54 
Std. Dev.  1.83  1.82 
Observations  120  120 
 
 
Table 3:   Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Test Results (with constant) 
  ut  pt 
  Test results for variable in levels 
ADF t-statistic  -1.90  -1.65 
p-value  0.33  0.46 
  Test results for first-differenced variable 
ADF t-statistic  -4.83  -9.95 




Table 4:  Johansen’s Cointegration Test Results 
Null hypothesis  Eigenvalue  Trace statistics 
Max-Eigenvalue 
Statistic 
r = 0  0.14  21.89*  16.97* 
r ≤ 1  0.04  4.93  4.93 
* Significant at the 5% level. Critical values: 20.26 and 9.17 at the 5% level for the trace test; 15.89 and 9.17 at the 
5% level for the maximum eigenvalue test.  
 
 
Table 5:  Granger Causality Test Results (with three lags) 
Null hypothesis  F-Statistic 
Producer price does not Granger cause wholesale price  4.59* 
Wholesale price does not Granger cause producer price  4.86* 
* Significant at the 1% level. 
 
 
Table 6:  Estimated Speed of Adjustment Coefficients (α‘s) and Cointegrating Coefficients (β‘s) 












T-statistics are in brackets.  
†The cointegrating equation is normalized by setting the cointegrating coefficient  of the producer price 







Table 7:  Estimates of the VECM (dependent variables are Δut and Δpt, t-statistic in brackets) 
  Δut  Δpt 




























* Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level. 
 
Figure 1:  A spatial duopsony line market 
 
Notes: Firm A (B) is located at r = 0 (r = d). The distance between A and B is d = 1. The solid black lines (downward 
sloped from the processors location) highlight the price u where local profits are zero (p-u-tr = 0). If say A 
sets ū, the local profits are positive for all r in [0, R] and negative for r=[R, d]. Hence, for all prices u=[0, p/2] 
there is a market profit Π(u) ≥ 0. 
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Figure 2:  Price transmission depending on the price elasticity of supply y 
 